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Abstract. We contend that our relationship with robots is too often seen within a 
universalistic and individualistic mind-frame. We propose a specific perspective in 
social robotics that we call anthrobotics. Anthrobotics starts with the choice to 
consider the human-machine intertwining as a dynamic union of more or less 
institutionalised collectives rather than separated discrete realities (individual 
humans, on one side, and discrete individualised machines on the other). We draw 
on our research in types of social interaction and esprit de corps to imagine more 
plural and harmonious forms of shared natural-artificial cognitive systems. We 
propose to look at four types of organised groups: conformative, autonomist, 
creative, and universalistic, that may provide guiding principles for the design of 
more diverse anthrobots. 
Keywords. anthrobotics, esprit de corps, cognitive systems, human-computer 
interaction, social robots 
1. Introduction: what is anthrobotics? 
Janus is the Roman God of interconnected and dialectic duality, of new beginnings 
because they suppose a simultaneous end, of bridges because they unite two territories, 
of doorways for they weld the inside and the outside. This paper considers the system 
Human-Robot as a collective Janus-faced coordinated and dynamic reality. We propose 
to call this hybrid artificial-natural-human collective unit the anthrobot, and the related 
approach anthrobotics. This is a broadening of the term “anthrobot”, which was mostly 
used in the past as a technical designation for anthropomorphic robotic devices, “man-
equivalent” devices, for example robotic prostheses [1]. 
Our anthrobotic perspective belongs to current interdisciplinary research on the social 
and institutional becoming of robotics and intelligent systems. It contemplates a practical 
horizon in the future conception and implementation of socially healthy automation. 
Anthrobotics is the choice to consider the human-machine intertwining from the 
perspective of organised and evolving collectives rather than separated individual entities. 
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 Association is not what happens after individuals have been defined with few properties, 
but what characterizes entities in the first place [2]: this is a conscious step away from 
methodological individualism. Individual users co-emerge as social agents from the 
matrix of a social process [3]. 
Our first move, before further experiments and applied practical cases, is to try and 
propose clarified definitions and choices. “Robot” can be considered to be a “contested 
concept” [4]. This means that a unique definition is difficult to agree upon by all 
interested parties. There are philosophical definitions of robots, legal, functional, 
technical definitions, and they each serve a different purpose. Yet, provided we keep in 
mind that a concept like robot has an evolving and metamorphic history (and pre-history) 
since the dramatic invention of the term in 1920 by Čapek [5], a simple and more or less 
consensual robot taxonomy might be useful before we define anthrobotics.  
We propose to call “robot” an algorithmic enabler. This definition might evolve and 
be refined, but we have opted for the concept of enablement because of its bivalence in 
psychological literature [6], which mirrors well the dual polarity of appreciation that 
machines exhibit in the public opinion: love of robots versus fear of robots. To enable a 
task can be positive and virtuous, as a synonym of facilitation, labour alleviation for 
example. But enabling is also related to notions of co-dependency, addiction, and loss of 
responsibility, when a user comes to depend too heavily on others (or on machines) for 
fulfilment of a sense of self [7]. Defining a robot as an algorithmic enabler contains 
therefore a useful ethical component: it allows evaluations in terms of simultaneously 
good and bad consequences, or “double effect” [8]. It also addresses the diverse potential 
uses of robots, whether they are related to labour or to emotional uses (industrial, social 
and domestic robots): it is possible to enable physical, mental, or emotional tasks. 
Anthrobotics relies on a philosophical view of humans as being the technological 
animal par excellence [9-11]. It is not only that humans are particularly gifted in 
developing new tools and techniques: we contend that we have always been anthrobots, 
on one hand working unceasingly towards social automation, functionalism, and the 
organisation and codification of the real, on the other hand engaging in more unstructured, 
aimless dispersions, recreation, developing creative and emotional aspirations [12].  We 
code and de-code our protocols under the dialectic influence of the creation of the real 
[13-14]. Our functionalism can be called a collective robotism.  
What is then an anthrobot? It can be understood as a human collective hybrid system 
made of flesh and protocols, with a fluctuating zone of embodiment. Anthrobots that pre-
date the computer age, such as institutions [15], organisations, corporations, nation states, 
rituals, collective organised projects, etc. provide blueprints we can use as models for 
understanding and developing more plural and harmonious socio-technical systems. We 
argue that looking at pre-computerised groups and their social protocols, where 
individuals assume, embody, and express different forms of belongingness or esprit de 
corps can provide guiding principles for the design of socially embedded robotics. 
Institutions are a collective anthrobot, a “coordination artefact” [16]. Human societies 
are organic and artificial, and at every moment, as social anthrobots, we are products and 
producers, partly creators and partly created, partly automata and partly agents capable 
of adaptability, self-actuation, and sense-making [3]. 
Because of its institutional aspect, anthrobotics is not only a matter of social 
engineering and ethics, but also of policy. If a collective is an axiomatic, intrinsically 
normative system [17], we can infer that anthrobotics can satisfy the requisites of a 
healthy and harmonious system when the democratic social contract favours respectful 
collaborations within socio-technical assemblages. Our paper will argue that there are at 
 least four different kinds of anthrobots with different core values, and that a 
universalising approach, even with the best intentions, should not always be adopted if 
we are to respect human pluralism in the digital era [18]. 
2. Human-machine relationship: symbiosis, determinism, and difference 
The increasing range of cognitive-embodied architectures we find around ourselves 
consist of continually evolving combinations of humans and learning machines [19]. 
Licklider famously called this close coupling a man-computer symbiosis, using a 
biological metaphor to describe this intimate association or close union [20]: “Men are 
flexible, capable of programming themselves contingently on the basis of newly received 
information. Computing machines are single-minded, constrained by their pre-
programming.” (p. 6).  
A critic could ask: are humans as self-determined as we think or hope, individually 
and collectively? Recent psychological research seems to confirm that humans often 
function in autopilot or ‘default mode’, letting their body and brain execute habitual tasks 
while consciousness is taking a break [21]. Mind wandering is said to occur in 30% to 
47% of people during most activities [22]. We are not in control of our actions and beliefs 
as much as we would like. Within the field of sociology, Bourdieu’s school demonstrated 
quantitatively how what we consider to be our personal intimate tastes and judgment in 
music, politics, or food are often determined by our socio-professional belonging [23]. 
The analysis of our social background and professional attachment to a specific mode of 
production (in short our social esprit de corps) can predict a great deal of our desires and 
opinions. Emitting a “sincere” value taste – not influenced by our social interest and 
milieu – is more difficult than we might think. 
Class determinism is a form of predictable social automation, even when agents feel 
they are being spontaneous. In new media studies, for example, this is akin to what is 
called the “echo chamber” effect, describing an unconscious contagion of beliefs and 
values amplified by social networks [24]. The idea of a collective consciousness and its 
determinism is an established concept in sociology since Durkheim’s Division of Labour 
in Society [25]: “The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members 
of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can be termed the 
collective or common consciousness. […] Individuals pass on, but it abides (p 38-39).” 
Our anthrobotic perspective is not a full determinism: it accepts the hypothesis that a 
portion of our individual personality is unique, or free by tapping into cosmic ongoing 
creation – what one of us calls the “Creal” [13-14] –, but we are indeed distancing 
ourselves from ideologies in which mostly free individuals make mostly rational, 
conscious and selfish choices. 
On the other side of the anthrobotic polarity, learning machines are becoming less 
predictable and more flexible, as demonstrated by progresses in digital multi-level 
representation-learning or ‘deep learning’ [26]. The fact that a robust automated system 
can exhibit this degree of unsupervised learning brings it a step closer to the capabilities 
of biological neural networks and the plasticity of the brain (even if the two realities 
remain significantly distant at the moment in terms of implementation). 
The term plasticity refers to the capacity to change, adapt and evolve, and conversely, 
a system is coined robust when it maintains its structure and functioning under potentially 
destructive contexts [27]. Until not so long ago, we could have said that in any 
anthrobotic system, any human-machine assemblage, the human polarity would have 
 stood for plasticity and the machine polarity for precision and robustness. But today, 
while robots are integrating adaptive and evolutionary features [28], humans continue – 
despite aspirations to absolute freedom encouraged by neoliberal individualism – to be 
more or less “automated” by their belonging to coded groups, whether they know/want 
it or not. These profiling groups are more than less determined today by their exposure 
to digital algorithms and data-driven machine-processed decision making. 
The behaviour of anthrobotic systems as a whole is still hard to predict and design, 
not so much due to the variety of human preferences and personalities – which is far 
from random even if not completely determined – than to the increased consequences of 
closely coupled dynamics between playful humans and learning robots. A recent 
example was prominently featured in the media: Tay was an artificial intelligence chatbot, 
meant to emulate a teen girl, designed for the Twitter platform and released by Microsoft 
Corporation in 2016. Within a day this anthrobot released sexually and ideologically 
charged messages based on patterns it discovered in human input which it could not but 
reproduce. In this case, human playfulness and facetiousness disrupted Microsoft’s 
protocol in order to manifest – rather mischievously and inelegantly – its thirst for 
freedom of speech, a human propriety which the chatbot could not exhibit but which is 
an important drive of the anthrobot Twitter. 
An anthrobotics approach should not forget that recreation and play – the enjoyment 
in deviating from routines and exploring “as if” possibilities – is a fundamental 
specificity of complex biological entities [29-30]. To avoid human negative disruption 
of social institutions, protocols and rituals without negating freedom of speech and re-
creation is like educating a child to respect social rules while respecting her feeling of 
autonomy and creativity: a universalistic approach, where one set of rules fits all 
situations, is likely to fail or to create rebellion [31]. 
Apart from the sense of recreation and play, what is it about social interaction that 
makes humans more complex in terms of interaction than the technology-centric, novel 
robotic systems we are creating? Can the human-machine and machine-human 
interactions that underpin digital anthrobots be informed by the decisional and value-
based intelligence exhibited by human-human interaction systems? Can systems-
architecting provide social arenas that empower humans in news ways that are 
appropriate to their respective collective context and aspirations (more freedom versus 
more security for example)? 
3. Esprit de corps 
We have chosen to look at the human-machine relation as an anthrobotic unit. By this 
we do not mean an isolated cyborg: our perspective cannot be a methodological 
individualism because on one hand, the machines and robots we refer to are or will soon 
be mass-produced, and on the other hand, individual humans are to a large extent the 
product of collective belongings and social determinisms. The anthrobotic unit is the 
conjunction of two more or less automatic collectives, robotic and human. We think that 
if we look at how human groups display organised interactions in specific ways, we will 
be able to develop intelligent systems that are also more diverse, if not more harmonious. 
The reason why human-to-human relations are not chaotic is not that we are rational 
beings calculating our individual interest at every minor interaction with another human 
[32]. This would demand too much brain energy and prove extremely difficult, since it 
would take infinite clairvoyance to anticipate the outcomes of the hundreds of 
 interactions we have with other humans every single day. Much of recent psychology 
agrees with sociology: when we behave or make choices on autopilot and default mode, 
we often apply the habitual rules and codes of a social group, even if we might not always 
be conscious of which social group we are attached to [33-36]. 
This phenomenon has been designated since the eighteenth century by the term esprit 
de corps, a French phrase that was immediately adopted talis qualis in English and that 
is still often used today by the media to qualify the more or less conscious commitment 
and loyalty to a group [37]. In Diderot and d’Alembert’s epoch-making Encyclopédie, 
we could learn already in 1752 that: 
 
Societies or particular groups within a people are to a certain extent little nations 
surrounded in a bigger one. They are like a graft, good or bad, implanted on the 
main trunk. Thus, these societies usually have a special quality, sometimes referred 
to as esprit de corps. In certain associations, for instance, the general character 
consists in the spirit of subordination; in others, and they are not the worst, the spirit 
of equality dominates. Some societies are attached to their customs, some believe 
they exist for the sake of change. What may be a fault in an individual can 
sometimes be a virtue in a group [38, p. 666]. 
 
The phenomenon of esprit de corps can have both positive effects and negative ones. 
As a notion of collective agency and collective identity, the term has played an important 
political, social and intellectual role in modern times since the birth of the expression in 
the French musketeer military corps [39]. It can be a synonym of in-group favouritism 
[40], attachment to groups [41], community spirit, group solidarity, group feeling, team 
spirit or “groupthink” [42]. It is worth noting that a systematic survey of contemporary 
uses of the phrase ‘esprit de corps’ in English-language since 2014 [37] shows that the 
idiom is generally employed today in a laudative sense, akin to the idea that a cohesive 
united group can achieve more than a poorly organised one, and also perform better than 
most individuals at some tasks [43]. 
Esprit de corps is related to solidarity [44], by which we define the more or less tight 
cohesion between members of a group. We do not have the space here to expand on the 
conceptual history of ambivalent understandings of esprit de corps since the international 
expansion of the expression in the eighteenth century. Suffice it to say that by examining 
in great detail the different uses of ‘esprit de corps’ in the last three centuries, one of us 
has found that at least four types of collective organisational bonding are typical of our 
occidental modernity. It is worth noting that this typology (see figure 1) is a posteriori 
compatible with the Grid-Group Cultural Theory developed by Douglas et al. in order to 
classify how much of people’s lives is controlled by the group they live in [45]. Our 
findings are also compatible with quantitative results in cross-cultural psychology [46]. 
The first type of collective bond in organised groups can be called a conformative 
esprit de corps [39]. Conformative collectives exhibit strong conformity and an enclosed, 
enclaved form of solidarity. This means that entering or exiting the in-group is a difficult 
process, while most members tend to obey the strict ethos of this type of group. The 
central value of conformative esprit de corps is duty. The principal mode of behaviour 
control in such a group is discipline as coercion. Historically, this is typical of 
religiously-grounded communities for example, or armies of soldiers, but we will see 
below in a contemporary anthrobotic example that hospitals can also be identified as 
conformative societies. The rationality behind such groups is hierarchism [47], or, in 
social psychology terms, vertical collectivism [48]. Decision-making in vertical 
 collectivism is based on hierarchical structures of power and on a sustained moral and 
cultural conformity. 
The second type of modern collective group-bond can be called universal esprit de 
corps. It is typical of the nation state and modern democracies since the end of the 
eighteenth century. Universal esprit de corps leans towards strong conformity via the 
standardisation of egalitarianism and consumerist freedom. Its mode of solidarity is 
open: most people can join the group in theory. Its core value is service. Its mode of 
control is a form of co-dependency, what Durkheim called “organic solidarity” [25] 
where everybody needs potentially anyone else’s services because of the division of 
labour. The corresponding social psychological setting of such groups is ideally 
horizontal collectivism. Horizontal collectivism is conceptualised as an orientation in 
which equal individuals make collective decisions via co-created standardised protocols. 
The third type of collective bond can be called autonomist esprit de corps [39]. It 
exhibits a rather enclaved form of solidarity aiming at autonomy and distinction. Its main 
value is craft (knowledge, art, or skill) and its mode of control is discipline as careful 
practice. It is typical of communities of practice, like labour guilds or specialised 
corporations (piano manufacturers Steinway & Sons, academic departments, or the 
NASA). The corresponding social setting of such groups is vertical individualism. 
Vertical individualism includes an acceptance of a certain form of inequality between 
individuals based on the progression of skills and the idea of collective improvement via 
individual development. Even if meritocratic, these groups exhibit high levels of in-
group attachment, and are relatively open to co-assistance and evolution. 
 
Figure 1. Four types of esprit de corps 
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 The fourth kind of collective bond can be called creative esprit de corps, with a drive 
towards open interactions and maximum autonomy. Its main relational type is élan and 
enthusiasm, as seen today for example in start-ups or newly founded research clusters. 
Its mode of control is enjoyment and expectation, and its social setting horizontal 
individualism. Even if each member is specialised, the division of labour is not as strict 
as in other groups. Most members are expected to be polyvalent and creative. 
Of course, as in all forms of categorisations into ideal-types, this division of social 
reality in four types of groups should be read as dynamic rather than rigid. Why not 
imagine a fifth kind of group, or less than four? Even if most groups are likely to be 
dominated in theory by one of the types of esprit de corps, we will find in practice 
examples of social entities that are at the intersection of at least two of the fields displayed 
in figure 1. Moreover, creative esprit de corps tends to evolve into autonomist esprit de 
corps, autonomist esprit de corps tends to become conformative, and universalistic esprit 
de corps constantly oscillates between conformative and creative tendencies. 
4. Pluralism by design 
Human groups that want to perform better, last longer, or evolve, should be lucid about 
their dominant mode of esprit de corps. Artificial cognitive systems should be designed 
with an awareness of the type of groups they are meant to serve behind each individual. 
Each anthrobot might evolve from being of one type to another. The success of 
Facebook’s social network for example depends on their surface identification with a 
digital empire of brotherhood, but the fact that the network refers to the core value of 
friendship should not lure us. Facebook as a business corporation displays a skilled 
commercial use of emotional values to serve the conformative universalisation of a 
service – effective advertising and big data collection – thanks to the emotional service 
that each member exchanges with others – an unpaid work of mutual congratulation and 
existential encouragement. 
When co-designing an anthrobotic system, we propose to ask if it is meant to serve 
primarily a universal, creative, conformative, or autonomist group, and how its core 
values could evolve or find a democratically acceptable balance within the context of a 
pluralistic society. We also need to distinguish between the extended world that the group 
might create via its users and the management of the group. The danger of any anthrobot 
is to over-automatise the human factor and produce an ambivalent form of enablement.   
In universalistic organised spaces, usually large in population, highly standardised 
and uniform systems with few variations work well, because they are meant to construct 
sameness, citizenship, or equality rather than difference. In creative groups, usually small, 
more emphasis is put on the self-development of each individual within a form of 
solidarity where each one can contribute equally to the co-creation of the system: flexible 
open systems and ongoing co-design should be favoured. In autonomist groups, where 
the main social interaction is craft-mediated, the system’s architects should favour a 
concentration on the quality of work and on details of execution: a member should not 
for example be structurally punished for privileging the core value of craft while 
disobeying bad decisions or impatient contingencies. 
In groups with strong conformity and enclosed solidarity, where the main social drive 
is duty, systems need to be robust with minimal evolution capacities and protection from 
the outside. Religious communities for example tend to die if they evolve. Such groups 
can end up being mortiferous in the long term and indulge in groupthink, abuse, injustice, 
 terrorism, and self-destruction, so they should incorporate in their anthrobotic system a 
minor but regular protocol for self-criticism [42]. 
How do we implement these distinctions into digital coding in a non-reductionist 
manner? Answering to this question is one of the future tasks of anthrobotics as an 
interdisciplinary field. We can find inspiration in previous research. Human Value 
Informatics, also called social informatics, is an important field since Kling’s pioneering 
research in the late seventies [49]. Kling explored how values such as privacy, reliability, 
or security were implicitly and systematically central within most artificial systems, and 
how typical models of systems architecting were tacitly assumed by designers [50]. 
Friedman and Kahn developed the field of Value Sensitive Design since the late eighties, 
an approach to the implementation of technologies that accounts for human values 
throughout the design process [51]. One of the important projects originating in their 
Value Sensitive Lab was the exploratory design of an urban simulator that incorporated 
a relatively wide range of stakeholders and values such as democratic engagement, 
freedom from bias, and political legitimacy [52]. 
Connecting multi-agent-system (MAS) design to the values of users and the purpose 
of anthrobots can avoid misadventures such as the above-mentioned Microsoft chatbot’s 
scandal. Even an apparently universalistic platform like Twitter hosts different types of 
group values: a study by Koepfler and Fleischmann shows that homeless individuals 
tweet more often than non-homeless ones a strong attachment to the following values: 
freedom, equality, broadmindedness, and justice [53]. There is a difference between 
embedding moral reasoning within computational engines with or without being 
conscious of the implicit values that are implemented [54]. The risk is to induce answers, 
practices, or reactions that do not represent the underlying dynamics or interests of a 
specific group. This risk can be a consequence of the well intentioned illusion that it is 
possible to have an ethics-free model of the world, or that rationalistic universalism is 
the best model for all situations. 
5. Institutional robotics: the piece assembly case study 
Another interesting approach in social robotics that we regard as synergic with 
anthrobotics is Institutional Robotics [16]. The authors also wish to understand how 
humans and robot creatures can meaningfully share the same world [55]. Institutional 
Social Robotics proposes to use human-inspired institutions to control systems of 
multiple robots within complex social spaces shared by natural and artificial entities. 
Like anthrobotics, an institutional robotics approach sees institutions as coordination 
artefacts that should be co-designed in accordance with a pluralistic strategy: we should 
not devise a coordination strategy that works well under all circumstances. If such a 
strategy existed, human societies would universalise and unify the different coordination 
constructs we employ (corporations, governments, markets, teams, committees, 
professional societies, mailing groups) [56], thus creating a form of totalitarianism. 
A concrete example of a contextual rather than universalistic approach is Monarch, a 
programme that implemented multi-robot cognitive systems in a hospital, the Portuguese 
Oncology Institute of Lisbon [55]. From an anthrobotic perspective, such a hospital could 
be seen before the use of robots as a conformative esprit de corps group: it is generally 
costly and difficult to become a member (you need to have cancer or study medicine), 
and at least for the patients it is difficult to exit the hospital alive. Such a hospital cannot 
be universalist (not everyone should have cancer), and will tend to privilege duty 
 between its employees rather than a risky creativity. However, the introduction of robots 
in the environment of the hospital operated a move towards a more autonomist-creative 
milieu, even if duty is probably still the core value of the hospital as a workplace. The 
fact that this hospital receives a significant number of children with cancer is probably a 
good explanation to understand their move towards anthropomorphic social robotics, 
since robots are usually popular among children [57]. 
There is today much interest in collective robotics, where a swarm perspective is 
taken [58], but institutional robotics takes one step further by exploring an institutional 
level of programming. Institutions are seen as cumulative sets of persistent artificial 
modifications made to a social environment or to the internal mechanisms of a subset of 
agents [59]. These sets are thought to be functional to the collective order. A human 
institution implies at least three properties: collective intentionality (we-representations), 
status function (symbolic functions assigned to objects), and deontic powers (reasons for 
action that are independent of desire) [15]. 
When designed to be an individual agent, a robot, even when conceived within a 
swarm, cannot escape the initial design of behaviours made by the programmers of the 
system. Conversely, an anthrobotic approach should allow behaviours to be subject to a 
decision to conform or not to conform to the norms. This social control should be 
implemented at the level of modifiable collective rules. 
An engineered example of this idea is given by the Piece Assembly Case Study [16], 
in which a collective of robots in a heterogeneous team need to collect components of 
different types. The latter are the building blocks needed for a coherent construction. 
Depending on how the components are delivered to the assembly site, robots can either 
receive high or low individual immediate rewards in the form of energy: “Robots are 
programmed so that they can give priority to their individual goal of remaining 
operational (preferring high immediate rewards but possibly contributing less to piece 
completion) or to the collective goal of maximizing team performance (accepting low 
immediate rewards and depending more on collective rewards) (p. 837).” Two 
approaches are tested, one decentralised (individual decisions taken by delivering robots), 
one institutional, where one robot is able to take the role of assembler, a coordinator that 
also collects an assembler fee (which can be compared to an institutional tax). 
Reported results showed that the system performed less well when the proportion of 
individualistic robots was higher than 55%, and when the institutional tax was above 
55% [16]. Such experiments could be developed as political simulations. We can for 
example speculate and meditate on how the above results could compare to the structure, 
for example, of the Swedish welfare society [60]. Yet simulations of robots interacting 
with robots can only partially account for the complexity of anthrobotic systems.  
One may ask what the transition path may look like, from a world where machines 
have been built and deployed in an individualistic fashion, to collectives where they 
enable a specific esprit de corps. It is also possible to endow such machines with the 
capacity for the formation of ad hoc teams [61], and corresponding mechanisms that 
allow them to cooperate despite an initial lack of knowledge regarding the utilities and 
policies of their teammates [62]. Different experimental approaches are possible; they 
should take into account that modelling human groups on robotic protocols, and vice 
versa, can be both inspiring and problematic. 
 6. Conclusion: learning from robots for better social groups? 
Integrating digital learning systems in a society composed of a combination of human 
expectations and digital protocols requires having diverse enough models of human 
groups, rather than a universalistic one-fits-all vision of the world. We have shown how 
the study of human organised groups in modern times can inspire pluralism in systems 
architecting. We have also shown how recent research is already providing examples that 
can inspire the perspective of anthrobotics. Further research and experiments need to be 
undertaken in order to develop and test this perspective. 
Anthrobotics must remain an interdisciplinary approach, combining for example, as 
this article did, the views of philosophers, roboticists, and computer scientists. One of 
our aims is to minimise the conceptual and practical divide that is too often structurally 
maintained between engineers and policy makers, in order to conceive and co-design 
politically, socially and individually, if not fully harmonious, at least positive and 
modifiable forms of anthrobotic enablement. A system that seems virtuous in the short 
term can become addictive and alienating in the long run. 
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